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I have to begin with a confession. Mind-body dualisms have not appeared attractive to me 
for a very long time. Moreover, I came away from reading After Physicalism with no 
change in my conviction that dualist views are not the way to go. On the other hand, most 
forms of physicalism are equally uncompelling, in my view. As I will explain below, both 
physicalist and dualist suffer from some shared unexamined assumptions rendering them 
deeply problematic. 
 
All arguments of which I am aware supporting dualism in are a priori and those in After 
Physicalism are no exception. In his introduction to the volume, Benedikt Göcke illustrates 
this through his discussion of how important intuitions such as conceivability implies 
possibility are. “Arguments for dualism presuppose that conceivability broadly understood 
is a reliable guide to possibility,” and since “conceivability is an a priori affair,” arguments 
for dualism are immune to any empirical considerations (p. 22). The key issue, according to 
Göcke, is “the question whether we are beings of such a kind that their conceivings entail 
possibility. If we are, then it is hard to escape the truth of dualism, and if we are not, then it 
is doubtful whether philosophy as a whole is possible at all” (p. 22). Of course, only a 
particular brand of a priori metaphysics might be at stake, here, not “philosophy as a 
whole.” Those suspicious of a priori metaphysics likely would view Göcke’s dilemma as a 
reductio of a priori approaches to philosophical questions. 
 
Göcke opens this anthology by noting that “Philosophy of mind is concerned with the one 
asking the question, not with objects surrounding the one asking the question” (p. 1). This 
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emphasis seems right to me. Much of the philosophy of mind literature treats mind–
consciousness or any other mental phenomena–as a kind of object no different in kind from 
electrons, molecules and rocks. That is to say, mind is objectified as a thing that can be 
studied like any other physical object. More on this objectification in a moment as the 
dualists in this anthology tend to fall into this same sin. 
 
In his introduction to the volume, Göcke (perhaps unintentionally) sets up a sharp 
dichotomy between dualism and a priori metaphysics, on the one hand, and 
physicalism/materialism and “empirical sciences as a method of philosophy” on the other 
(p. 12). This is an unfortunate way of carving up the landscape (Göcke, perhaps, realizes 
this by adding “often” as a qualifier to his claim about physicalism and an empirical 
sciences approach to philosophy). While it may be the case that many dualists are a priori 
metaphysicians, it is also the case that many materialists are a priori metaphysicians, too. 
Moreover, it is not the case that looking to the sciences to inform philosophical method 
necessarily leads to adopting physicalism. 
 
Brief Overview 
 
There are eleven essays in After Physicalism, only two of which are reprints (“Against 
Materialism” by Alvin Plantinga and “From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance 
Dualism” by Richard Swinburne). 
 
To give a brief rundown of the action in this volume, in Uwe Meixner’s “Naturalness of 
Dualism” he points out that physicalism is not an implication of the sciences (this lack of 
implication should not be a surprise to most readers) and goes on to defend dualism by 
sketching proposed solutions to two problems raised against dualism: articulating causal 
relations between the nonphysical and the physical entities, and articulating intentional 
relations between nonphysical states and physical states. Meixner ends by describing–
though not presenting compelling evidence for–three ways in which dualism is natural 
(none of which have much to do with naturalized metaphysics, naturalized epistemology 
and the like except for the third): (1) dualism is natural to those people who have not been 
steeped in philosophy; (2) dualism is culturally natural in the sense that historically most 
cultures have had dualist commitments; and (3) dualism is biologically natural in that it is a 
result of evolution.  
 
In “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism,” E. J. Lowe argues that human persons are neither 
Cartesian egos nor identical with their physical bodies. Instead, we are psychological 
substances capable of possessing physical states. 
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John Foster’s “Subjects of Mentality” distinguishes items of mentality from subjects of 
mentality and argues realism regarding the physical world commits us to the thesis that 
human subjects of mentality have wholly nonphysical natures. The implication is that 
human subjects of mentality have no physical properties (corporeality, location in physical 
space). Foster’s arguments, however, presupposes that human subjects of mentality are sui 
generis “radically different in nature from all that pertains to [their] character and life as” 
physical things (p. 85). 
 
Being reprints, the essays by Plantinga and Swinburne already may be familiar to many 
readers, so I will skip a brief synopsis. I found William Hasker’s “Is Materialism Equivalent 
to Dualism?” to be the most interesting essay of the collection. He argues that the most 
plausible versions of materialism and dualism–emergentist materialism and emergentist 
dualism, respectively–are almost equivalent. This may not be so surprising as the latter was 
modeled on the former (p. 182), but both forms of emergence illustrate the possibilities for 
getting away from some of the traditional materialist-dualist categories. 
 
A.D. Smith’s “Benign Physicalism” expresses a kind of epistemic and metaphysical 
pessimism about what can be known about the qualities of those entities described by 
scientific theories. In essence, this is because all our scientific concepts are supposedly 
functional concepts (a tendentious thesis), hence they give us no understanding of the nature 
of physical entities (a tendentious claim). Given this view, Smith argues that human 
conscious experiences could be the ultimate realizers of the causally and functionally 
specified physical entities of our theories. Nevertheless, such a role for our mental 
experiences would be contingently dependent because, depending on the causal structure of 
the world, it could be the case that the behavior of causally and functionally specified 
physical entities ultimately are realized by physical properties or mental experiences. 
However, Smith maintains, the former physicalism (by implication the latter dualism) is 
philosophically uninteresting because of its dependence on the contingent causal structure 
of the world (pp. 224-225). The judgment that such physicalism (or dualism) is 
uninteresting seems odd since it is the actual causal structure of the world that should be of 
interest to philosophers as well as scientists. 
 
Howard Robinson’s “Qualia, Qualities, and Our Conception of the Physical World” also 
proved to be a very interesting essay. He argues that Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument 
actually shows that the physicalist is unable to account for our understanding of the physical 
world beyond purely abstract and mathematical notions. Physicalism is incapable of 
accounting for empirical qualities we experience in the same fashion that it is incapable of 
accounting for qualia such as red. Hence, scientific knowledge appears problematic on the 
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physicalist view because our experience of these empirical qualities is necessary to the 
sciences. 
 
In “Groundwork for a Dualism of Indistinction,” Göcke deploys a possible worlds 
framework where possible worlds are constituted by individual essences. He argues that as a 
thesis about actual-world particulars, physicalism fails because the I is not a particular (it 
turns out that the I is neither identical to nor indistict from the human person with which it 
is associated). 
 
Stephen Priest elaborates a distinction between conditioned and unconditioned philosophy 
in “The Unconditioned Soul.” He argues that physicalist accounts cannot do justice to a 
person’s experience because ultimately we each are unbounded, unchanging and timeless in 
significant respects. No genuine arguments are given in support of these claims. Priest’s 
discussion is very similar to reports of meditative mystical experiences from Buddhist and 
Hindu traditions and is subject to the same subtleties regarding appraising their relevance to 
ontological issues of the self.  
 
In “Beyond Dualism,” Thomas Schärtl discusses resurrection and proposes a model that 
offers an alternative to some materialist and dualist accounts of resurrection. 
 
Substantive Issues 
 
1. Objectification 
As I mentioned earlier, physicalist accounts of the self, personhood, consciousness and the 
like tend to objectify their targets of analysis. Mind, to speak generically of these targets, is 
treated as being no different in kind from molecules, moles and mountains. Why is this 
physicalist tendency so pernicious?  
 
Louis Dupré (1976, pp. 3-4) identified a form of “objectivism” that traces back to the pre-
Socratic philosophers, a form of objectification focusing on “the physis, the intrinsic nature 
of things...the world as it is in itself rather than as it fleetingly impresses itself upon the 
perceiver’s momentary condition.” The focus was on the “outward,” where the 
“subject...seems to have meant little more than the window through which they saw the 
world.” This form of objectivism has been handed down through the centuries becoming a 
major force in early modern philosophy and subsequently in modern culture and the social 
sciences. On Dupré’s analysis, such objectification took on a kind of “analytic objectivity” 
yielding a “functional view” of humans, where persons are either skillful manipulators or 
the objects of manipulation. 
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Objectification is a stance toward things–including persons!–that abstracts away from so-
called subject-related qualities (Bishop 2007, pp. 113-122; this already seems to stack the 
deck against any accounts taking subject-related qualities as serious keys to the reality of 
the mental such as the dualist accounts in After Physicalism). These qualities include most 
of the meanings of and relationships among things that show up within our ordinary 
experience, values, aims and concerns. In essence this stance separates the knowing subject 
from the flux of everyday experience so that knowers come to view all events–including 
their own experiences!–as separable, controllable elements of formal analysis. 
 
There are a number of problems with objectification. First, this stance was only made 
possible by a number of cultural affordances that have everything to do with shifts in human 
ways of conceptualizing the world (e.g., Turner 1985; Taylor 1989, 2007). Since all forms 
of inquiry require some background assumptions, and the abstractions of objectification are 
no different, this is not the rigorously objective stance many take it to be (more on this 
below). Second, objectification involves excising the values and meanings making up the 
everyday lifeworld of our experience. We only engage in this kind of abstraction because of 
commitments and purposes we have, say for particular forms of inquiry. Since one of the 
things in question in debates about physicalism is the nature of mind, excising subject-
related qualities such as meanings and values is question begging. Third, although 
objectification certainly has proved its worth in natural science inquiry, mental phenomena 
are quintessentially part of the human realm, where objectification has proven problematic 
to say the least. A key reason for objectification’s failure when applied to the understanding 
of the human condition is that it represents as much a moral as an epistemological ideal 
(e.g., Bernstein 1976 and 1983; Taylor 1985a, b; Slife and Williams 1995; Richardson, 
Fowers and Guignon 1999; Bishop 2007). 
 
One way this fusion of moral and epistemological ideas comes about is through 
objectification’s gulf between knowing subject and thing-to-be-known. When seeking to 
understanding the properties of electrons, molecules and stars, this may be an appropriate 
stance to take. However, taking an objectified stance towards mind does more than just beg 
the question on physicalism. It also distorts the mental phenomena we are trying to 
understand by treating the self-interpreting beings engaged in mental phenomena as if they 
are no different in kind from electrons, molecules and stars (a value judgment if ever there 
was one!). It certainly is possible to investigate and describe the physical and chemical 
properties of a star without implying any judgments about whether it would have been 
better if the if formed in a different way or place. In contrast, when investigating and 
describing minds and mental phenomena, such judgments about what is good are essentially 
unavoidable given that values and value judgments are inescapable elements of our mental 
lives. 
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Under objectification, agents are conceived as being sharply distinct from the physical and 
social realms, and this allows agents to take on a largely instrumental relationship between 
self and world (Taylor 1985a, pp. 187-212; Slife and Williams, 1995). The agent is “in but 
not of” the world so to speak. Furthermore, if one assumes all events in the physical and 
mental realms flow as sequences of efficient causes and their effects, this meshes well with 
the conception of agency as mainly concerned with an individual’s manipulation of those 
causes to produce desired outcomes. This is to objectify all causes and effects as 
independent objects standing in causal relations to one another.  
 
Hence, an objectifying stance means to “regard the world as it is independently of the 
meanings it might have for human subjects, or of how it figures in their experience” (Taylor 
1989, p. 31). Charles Taylor calls this the punctual self (1995, p. 7), a self pictured as 
disengaged from the physical and social realms, where interactions between self and world 
are structured purely in terms of efficient causation. This is the kind of self that is ideally 
suited to exercising instrumental action in a world of efficient causes. The punctual self is 
disengaged in such a way that it is ideally free or unsubordinated, a kind of “sovereign self” 
(Dunne 1996, p. 139) able to manipulate these realms as it pleases. Any overlap between 
self and world, then, is seen as compromising not only the individual’s autonomy, but also 
her integrity, dignity and other values. 
 
This profound aspiration to autonomy and separateness is certainly an epistemological ideal 
as expressed in objectification’s splitting of the knowing subject from all other objects, but 
clearly it is a moral ideal as well. It reflects and is reinforced by the intense liberationist or 
anti-authoritarian temper of modern Western culture, where “To be free in the modern sense 
is to be self-responsible, to rely on your own judgment, to find your purpose in yourself” 
(Taylor 1995, p. 7). This is what Michael Sandel calls the “unencumbered self” (1996, p.96) 
that rejects “any view that regards us as obligated to fulfill ends we have not chosen–ends 
given by nature or God, for example, or by our identities as members of families, peoples, 
cultures, or traditions” (p.12). The historian of psychology, Phillip Cushman (1990, p. 604) 
describes this as the “bounded, masterful self” that “is expected to function in a highly 
autonomous, isolated way” and “to be selfsoothing, self-loving, and self-sufficient.” 
Unfortunately, there is evidence that such exaggerated pretensions to autonomy and 
uniqueness almost inevitably collapse into an “empty self,” whose characteristics of 
fragility, sense of emptiness, and proneness to fluctuation between feelings of worthlessness 
and grandiosity are often said to be the hallmarks of neurotic psychopathology. 
 
Richard Bernstein (1976) shows how adherence to objectification modeled after natural 
science inquiry, though purportedly fostering “value-neutral, objective claims subject only 
to the criteria of public testing,” harbors “disguised ideology.” These “proposed theories 
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secrete values and reflect controversial ideological claims about what is right, good, and 
just” (1976, p. 31), reflecting a “total intellectual orientation” (1976, p. 51) anchored in a 
complete package of high Enlightenment ideals such as individualism, skepticism, 
instrumentalism, and emancipation. Construing mental states as physical states (or as 
realized by physical states) amenable to public testing and observation, and thus as subject-
independent, is but one way such objectification takes place in physicalism. 
 
An example of a disguised ideology that pervasively shapes much social and philosophical 
inquiry into human mind and behavior is liberal individualism (e.g., Taylor 1985a, b; 
Richardson, Fowers and Guignon 1999; Bishop 2007). This is a particular ethical vision or 
understanding of the nature of human action and the good life that defends individual 
autonomy and stresses “negative liberty”—what we are free from rather than what we are 
free for. Such a one-sided emphasis obscures the cultural embeddedness and lasting social 
ties endemic to human mental life and action. Moreover, it advocates thoroughgoing 
neutrality towards and distancing from all values as a way of promoting particular basic and 
laudable ends such as liberty, tolerance, individuality and human rights (substantial values 
all). At the same time, liberal individualism characterizes human action and motivation as 
exclusively self-interested; but this undermines our capacity to respect and cherish others. In 
this way, liberal individualism has a built-in instability that erodes our commitment to the 
admirable modern ideals of freedom and justice. Such disguised ideology is part and parcel 
of the seemingly innocent commitment to characterizing and studying mind and actions 
through objectification (Taylor 1985a, b; Bishop 2007). This is not so surprising when we 
consider that liberal individualism is the prevailing moral outlook in modern times, so it is 
bound to show up uncritically in the theorizing of those pretending to be “value-neutral” but 
very much, like all of us, creatures shaped by modern culture. 
 
So the objectification of mind found in so much philosophy and the social sciences is 
inescapably value-laden or morally colored. How could it be otherwise? These are 
intellectual endeavors intended, in part, to make better practical, ethical, or existential sense 
of human life and living. These are matters about which we all care deeply, so we cannot 
escape some ethical commitments. However, we can critically assess them by teasing out 
their assumptions and testing them against experience and other points of view in critical 
dialogue—which is what we do anyway, in everyday life and moral or political debate. 
 
2. Dualism and Objectification 
Why go into all this background on objectification? Physicalism certainly is deeply 
enmeshed in objectifying mind; hence, it imports all the problems just outlined. Yet one 
does not have to read far in After Physicalism to find objectification taking place in dualist 
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approaches to mind. For example, take Lowe’s characterization of human persons as 
psychological substances: 
 
More specifically, a person, in my view, is a substantial individual belonging to a 
natural kind which is governed by distinctively psychological laws, with the 
consequence that individuals of this kind possess persistence conditions which are 
likewise distinctively psychological in character (p. 49). 
 
Lowe goes on to say that he is “perfectly ready to allow that psychological substances 
should possess material characteristics” including “physical states among their modes” (p. 
50). While this move may get Lowe out of standard objections to Cartesian dualism, it does 
not affect in the least the objectification of the person or self that he shares with Descartes. 
To analyze human persons as a “natural kind...governed by distinctively psychological 
laws” is to fall into the objectification that comes from identifying natural kinds as 
subsumed under or governed by laws (e.g., Bernstein 1976; Bishop 2007). The modern 
subject-object split tracing at least back to Descartes is fully evident in Lowe. 
 
One of the ways that the individualist ideals underlying objectification show up in Lowe’s 
account is in his sketch of what it means for a self to have a body–what is it to be the self’s 
body? For Lowe, the fact that the self’s physical characteristics supervene in some sense on 
a particular body is insufficient to make the body the self’s body. According to Lowe, what 
body is the self’s is a “matter of the self’s perceiving and acting ‘through’ that body,” where 
bodily actions and perceptions are directly subject to the self’s will (p. 54). Think in terms 
of Danto’s conception of basic actions. The particular psychological substance that is the 
self and its body are treaded as a punctual self with a body that it can manipulate as it sees 
fit. This is as objectified an account as any physicalist’s. (There is a further issue in that 
Lowe’s criteria do not work for the many bodily parts are not subject to the self’s will such 
as hearts, kidneys and nerves. In what sense are those “my body” if they do not share an 
intimate connection with me via my will? Taken literally, Lowe’s criterion implies that only 
some parts of “my body” are my self’s body, namely only those where I am capable of basic 
actions via my will). 
 
Lowe does have an interesting line of argument against the supervenience of thought on 
brain processes (pp. 61-66) that very much depends on historical conditions through which 
“persons create other persons” (p. 65). This is not due to any ontological changes in the 
brain that we can discern; rather, the change is in the ontology of society and social 
relationships. Though intriguing, his historical sketch of cultural development is quite out of 
date with the most recent anthropological and archeological work (e.g., fundamental 
intellectual and social transformations that have no discernible correspondence with brain 
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changes predate 35,000 years by tens of thousands; see Holden 2004; Balter 2010; 
Henshilwood et al. 2011). Be that as it may, Lowe’s argument that personhood is dependent 
on social development is in tension with his objectification of persons and social 
interactions demanded by his definition of persons as psychological substances. 
 
I will be briefer with three more examples of objectification. A second instance is Foster’s 
discussion of what he characterizes as a weak version of physicalism, namely that 
 
the putative corporeal subjects are assigned core natures that include a nonphysical 
component...along with the physical properties that he has as a biological organism, 
each human subject possesses, in his core nature, an additional nonphysical 
character which is what gives him the capacity to be a mental subject (pp. 91-92). 
 
Unfortunately, his objection to this form of physicalism depends on objectifying the person 
along the same lines as a writing pen (pp. 92-3). I suspect the only way to genuinely make a 
case for or against any kind of moderate psycho-physical being is, first, to break out of 
objectifying such a being and, second, to consider the possibilities for such being without 
resorting to objectification (see below). Since the start of modern philosophy, however, it 
has been difficult to resist the siren call of objectification of mind and persons. 
 
A third example of objectification is Swinburne’s definition of substance: “A substance is a 
thing (other than an event) which can (it is logically possible) exist independently of all 
other things of that kind (viz., all other substances) other than its parts. Thus, tables, planets, 
atoms, and humans are substances” (p.148). Humans are objectified things along with tables 
and planets. The punctual self is clearly on display, here, (that the tremendous dependencies 
humans have on other humans for their existence is overlooked in Swinburne’s classifying 
humans as substances is jaw dropping). 
 
A final example is Göcke objectifying persons or individuals as objects with properties. 
Given his possible world analysis, “a possible world is nothing over and above a maximally 
consistent co-exemplification of individual essences” (p. 275). This includes human beings, 
persons, minds, or what have you, along with rocks, trees and planets. He goes on to argue 
that having a duplicate Benedikt Paul in another possible world “could be actual while I am 
not related to that world in any way. Someone else could live my life. Therefore, I am not 
identical with the human being Benedikt Paul” (p. 276). Again, the punctual self of 
objectification is evident. 
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3. Objectification and Cultural Ideals 
I could cite more examples from this volume. What is most interesting about After 
Physicalism, is the extent to which these dualists share with physicalists a common set of 
assumptions and ideals centered around the punctual self and objectification. How would 
the contours of physicalist-antiphysicalist debates change if all parties were to drop out of 
this framework, leaving behind its subject-object split, its puntualizing of the self, its ideals 
of liberal individualism and instrumental agency? 
 
To my knowledge, such an alternative has been little explored. Both physicalists and 
antiphysicalists struggle with what seems to be an intractable dilemma in understanding the 
relationship among mental and physical aspects of personhood and agency: If mind is too 
different from our physical bodies (e.g. as in Cartesian dualism), then the connection 
between the mental and the physical is mysterious. On the other hand, if mind is identified 
too closely with physical phenomena, then the psychological and moral phenomena we take 
to be important are reducible to underlying physical processes (e.g. neurophysiological and 
chemical interactions) and appear to be epiphenomenal at best. I suspect that our penchant 
for theoretical and philosophical theories that objectify mind and persons lies at the heart of 
this intractable dilemma. 
 
All the authors of After Physicalism are concerned with what might be called the problem of 
the disappearance of the mental. By emphasizing the physical aspects of agency the mental 
appears to be squeezed out, leaving no room for the latter. If one is committed to 
physicalism and that all interactions are of efficient causal form, it seems that there is no 
place for anything mental. One example of a physicalist approach to mind will serve as an 
example. 
 
In Mind in a Physical World, Jaegwon Kim proposed a functionalist solution as a response 
to this feared disappearance of the mental. Functionalism enters the picture in the following 
way. Mental properties are understood as functionalist properties in the sense that such 
properties are specified by the roles they play as “causal intermediaries between sensory 
inputs and behavioral outputs,” where, on a physicalist account, physical properties are the 
only possible candidates for causally efficacious properties (Kim 1998, p. 19). The typical 
example is that of pain. On this functionalist analysis, for someone to be in pain is for them 
to be in some internal state–caused by tissue damage, say–that typically causes winces, 
groans, whines and other characteristic pain behaviors. Being in pain is then a higher-order 
property: It is the property of being a property caused by appropriate nerve stimulation. For 
someone to have the property of being in pain is for them to have the appropriate property 
(such as tissue damage triggering appropriate nerve firing) in appropriate circumstances 
such that the effects typical of pain are caused. 
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Suppose you are a person who exhibits tremendous commitment, say as someone who spent 
several years dedicated to caring for your aged parents or who spends several hours each 
week working with inner city youth. Instead of focusing on your commitment, and the 
personal vision and character traits standing behind it, the physicalist-functionalist account 
would say that you are in an internal state characterized by particular neural activation 
patterns, physical receptors, and so forth, engaged in a consistent activity. Your 
commitment to care for your parents or serve inner city youth is a functional property that is 
fully specified by its physical realization. 
 
Hence, the essence of functionalism is that the role or function a specific property plays in a 
given context specifies that property. On Kim’s account, it is the underlying physical base 
properties operating in chains of efficient causation that make it possible for what we call 
mental properties to exhibit these functional roles. 
 
From their somewhat different points of view, the moves made by physicalists and dualists 
to recover mental agency gain some plausibility because they both surreptitiously 
presuppose an instrumental view of agency that appears to fit well within a physical world 
of efficient causal interactions. An instrumental view of agency flows directly from 
objectification (e.g., Kim’s analysis of pain or commitment as realized by underlying chains 
of efficient physical causation, or Lowe’s envisioning bodily actions and perceptions as 
directly subject to the self’s instrumental will). As Taylor has noted, the “ethic” and 
“epistemology” of objectification “calls for disengagement from the world and the body and 
the assumption of an instrumental stance towards them” (1989, p. 159). As Colin Gunton 
elaborates, 
 
Disengagement means standing apart from each other and the world and treating the 
other as external, as mere object. The key is in the word instrumental: we use the 
other as an instrument, as the mere means for realizing our will, and not as in some 
way integral to our being. It has its heart in the technocratic attitude: the view that 
the world is there to do with exactly as we choose (1993, p. 14). 
 
So objectification and the punctual self lead to disengagement from the world so that agents 
can only relate to it in an instrumental way, something with which we in the West are 
comfortable given our cultural individualism and hyper-concern to protect the rights and 
liberties of individuals at all costs. Hence, viewing agency as instrumental, in turn, gains 
plausibility by presupposing some worthwhile, meaningful ends directing such agency, and 
most often these ends are those of liberal individualism. 
 
Essays Philos (2013) 14:2                                                                                                               Bishop | 280 
 
 
 
I want to suggest that the seemingly intractable problem of making room for mental agency 
in the world envisioned by physicalist and dualist philosophers stems, in part, from 
unexamined assumptions regarding moral ideals and human capacities associated with this 
instrumental view of action (which is part and parcel with objectification). These 
assumptions need serious reconsideration, but are rarely acknowledged or discussed among 
philosophers of mind. 
 
On the instrumental view, agents are fully immersed in the efficient causal flow of events 
and processes, while, at the same time, being somehow able to turn onto this causal flow 
and manipulate it to determine the future course of such events and processes according to 
their preferences. The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas (1973; 
1991)–apparently never consulted by physicalist or dualist philosophers of mind–have 
propounded a famous ‘critique of instrumental reason’ which goes to the heart of the 
problems with this technocratic conception of agency. 
 
According to Habermas, to a great extent modern society is built upon a damaging 
confusion of praxis with techne (roughly culturally meaningful activities and technical 
capacity respectively). This kind of society tends to collapse the cultural and moral 
dimensions of life into merely technical and instrumental considerations. As a result, 
according to Habermas (1973, p. 254), we imagine applying theory to practice chiefly as a 
matter of applying principles uncovered by empirical science in a manipulative or 
instrumental manner to produce desired results. This heavy emphasis on technical or 
instrumental action both reflects and encourages our modern emphasis on gaining control 
over natural and social processes to enhance human welfare and well-being. Doubtless this 
increased capacity for control has often benefitted us. But, in Habermas’ view, one of the 
key shortcomings of this elevation of techne over praxis is that, even as we grow in 
instrumental prowess, we progressively lose our ability to evaluate the worth of ends on any 
basis other than the sheer fact that they are preferred or desired. As a result, too many 
spheres of life are dominated by a calculating and instrumental viewpoint which discerns 
means-ends relationships, performs cost-benefit analyses, and seeks to maximize, as an end 
in itself, our control or mastery over events. 
 
The critical theorist Max Horkheimer (1974/1947) explored the contradictions and 
deleterious consequences of this one-sided instrumental view of human agency. He argued 
that the modern outlook glorifying instrumental reason actually turns into its opposite or an 
“eclipse of reason.” Scientific ‘neutrality’ dictates that we concentrate on discerning law-
like means-ends connections among events, which are supposedly ‘objective,’ and regard 
social and moral values as merely ‘subjective’ and irrelevant to scientific inquiry (as 
positivist philosophers of science recommended). But this seriously undermines our ability 
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to reason together about the inherent quality of our way of life and about what ends we 
might best seek. As the means of control and influence grow, life gets more organized and 
complicated at the same time that we lose the ability to set priorities and impose needed 
limits. In this way, critical theory illumines the sources of our tendency to pollute the 
environment, our fascination with power and control to the neglect of important values, and 
our stressful, overextended consumer lifestyles. 
 
In contrast, most often, we cooperate with, deliberate with, contend with, or seek to 
influence one another as we hammer out shared cultural and ethical concerns. Humans often 
pursue activities and meanings not for their instrumental value in gaining control over 
events, but for what we take to be their intrinsic meaning or inherent worth. Even when we 
subordinate praxis to techne in a damaging way, we do so because of the significance, 
merit, or contributions to human welfare it procures for us. Some meanings of this sort 
always direct our instrumental activity. To conceive of human agency as fundamentally 
instrumental, then, tragically confuses quintessential and important human capacities with 
narrow technical prowess. 
 
However, the congruence between the instrumental view and our cultural ideals runs deeper 
than merely its seeming affinity with a scientific or technological worldview. The dominant 
epistemological outlook of modern times is a ‘representational’ one according to which 
knowledge consists essentially in the correspondence of our beliefs to an external reality 
from which they must be sharply distinguished (clearly also part of the objectification 
“package”). Often this epistemological doctrine has seemed to support and be supported by 
the successes of natural science in modern times. That is no longer the case. Powerful 
critiques of positivism and new postempiricist views of the history and nature of scientific 
inquiry (such as Thomas Kuhn’s and Michael Polanyi’s) now stress its hermeneutical 
dimensions. Observation is considered to be dependent to some degree on theory and the 
confirmation or rejection of theories is to some degree conventional and influenced by 
particular values (Bernstein 1983). Still, the representational view seems to have done little 
damage in the past to deter progress in the natural sciences, and its picture of the knowing 
subject as a rather bloodless, detached observer of an independent and objective order of 
reality or fact continues to shape our outlook in many areas of modern culture, philosophy 
of mind being one of those. 
 
The main reason for the persistence of the instrumental viewpoint is the profound aspiration 
to individuality and separateness entailed by this view of the knowing subject: a punctual 
self, as much a moral as an epistemological or scientific ideal (see above). It reflects the 
intense liberationist or anti-authoritarian temper of the modern era, which dictates that any 
overlap between self and world will compromise the individual’s integrity and dignity. It 
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has been suggested that this fact helps explain why the mainstream social and behavioral 
science typically advocates strictly value-neutral explanations or descriptions of human 
dynamics and has insisted on treating cultural and moral values as purely subjective (Slife 
and Williams 1995, p. 195; Richardson, Fowers and Guignon 1999; Bishop 2007). The 
motivation for this approach may be, in part, that important meanings and values be kept at 
a distance for fear they will compromise our autonomy and integrity. 
 
This same aspiration to a punctual conception of self is presupposed by Kim’s functional 
account, which is carried out totally in individualist terms, emphasizing various mental 
states are actually internal neural states in an agent’s brain. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, 
this punctual self also underlies many dualist accounts in After Physicalism. 
 
4. Beyond Objectification 
If my diagnosis is right, physicalist and dualist objectifying views of mind tend to be 
heavily influenced by unacknowledged epistemological and ethical ideals. Here, I can only 
suggest some ideas that may prove helpful for getting around these dilemmas of mental 
agency and contribute to a more plausible conception of engaged agency. By framing the 
discussion in terms of engaged agency, I am, of course, implying that views heavily 
influenced by an instrumental notion of action, a punctual notion of the self and a 
representational epistemology are disengaged views of agency. No doubt many physicalists 
and dualists would object that they are attempting to understand agents as acting in the 
everyday world and that to attribute a disengaged stance to their views is terribly unfair. So 
the first thing we have to do is get clear about two different conceptions of engagement, or 
world shaping as Taylor calls it (Bishop 2007, pp. 23-25). 
 
The first conception of engagement, or world shaping, is characterized by the way efficient 
causes impinge upon us due to our embodiment. For instance, at this moment you cannot 
see the wall behind you because the light refracted off its surface cannot reach your retinas. 
Your physical disposition and the physical properties of light are currently juxtaposed such 
that your embodiment strongly shapes you perception and, hence, your world and your 
engagement with it. By contrast, you are in a position to see the words on the screen. In this 
sense the disposition of your body shapes your perceptions. Call this a weak sense of 
embodiment or world shaping, where the characteristic feature is how your surroundings are 
related to your body in terms of efficient causation. 
 
The second conception of engagement, or world shaping–I will refer to it as the strong 
sense–is qualitatively different. Consider an example from Taylor: 
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As I sit here and take in the scene before me, this has a complex structure. It is 
oriented vertically, some things are “up,” others are “down”; and also in depth, some 
are “near,” others “far.” Some objects “lie to hand,” others are “out of reach”; some 
constitute “unsurmountable obstacles” to movement, others are “easily displaced.” 
My present position doesn’t give me a “good purchase” on the scene; for that I 
would have to shift farther to the left. And so on (Taylor 1993, p. 218). 
 
To say that persons are engaged in this strong sense means that understanding such an 
experience necessarily draws upon concepts only making sense against the background of 
the particular type of bodies persons have. The terms in quotes in the Taylor passage are 
understood only from the perspective of an embodied agent. Hence, to understand what it is 
to be “out of reach” requires being an agent with our bodily capacities. This is to say, that 
the very nature of experiencing things in the world as human beings is primarily constituted 
by our particular form of embodiment and not in the main by efficient causal relations. 
 
For instance, to see your friend sad after hearing she did not get the job certainly makes use 
of efficient causation in the sense that photons refracting off your friend reach your retinas 
and sound waves from your friend reach membranes in your ear. However to interpret what 
has happened to her and its significance for her, as well as to know how to comfort her in 
this situation, derives from your embodied experience as a person feeling what is happening 
to her. Furthermore in order to comfort your friend requires your embodiment with the 
particular capacities of a human being (e.g., warm hug, soft and soothing speech, confident 
and encouraging manner, etc.). 
 
To the extent that physicalist and dualist views of mind are engaged, they can only be 
considered so in the weak sense of engagement. But it is the strong sense of engagement–
what we might call genuine world shaping–that is characteristic of humans. This sets us 
apart from other things like molecules, moles and mountains, which “engage” their 
surroundings through efficient causal relations only. And it is this strong sense of 
engagement, I suggest, that needs to be front and center of any conception of mind and 
agency. 
 
A second suggestion takes its point of departure from this distinction between weak and 
strong forms of engagement. Part of the reason why physicalist and dualist approaches seem 
to struggle with mind and agency is their reliance upon what I will broadly term a 
mechanistic approach to mind. Physicalist approaches are influenced by much current work 
in the neural and cognitive sciences. There are two models or paradigms for the workings of 
the brain in such sciences. The first is the physics model, where the components of the brain 
are viewed as subject to various kinds of forces (physical, chemical, biological, etc.) and 
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these interactions produce the behaviors that are termed mental (Bishop 2007, pp. 199-200). 
The second is the computer model, where the components of the brain are viewed as 
information processors operating on information inputs and, in turn, producing specified 
outputs identified as mental behaviors (Bishop 2007, pp. 200-202). 
 
Dualist theories also exhibit a mechanistic approach in that they tend to rely solely on weak 
world shaping and efficient causation in their objectification of minds and persons. Whether 
its Lowe’s psychological self as a law-governed punctual entity or Swinburne’s human 
classified as substances like tables and chairs, the main mode by which mind and action 
take place is in the form of efficient causation and instrumental action. 
 
However, such objectifying approaches have a number of problems, two relevant ones that I 
will mention here. First, as noted earlier, such approaches are anything but objective as they 
incorporate a moral perspective displacing or ruling out other perspectives (e.g. Daston 
1992; Bishop 2007). Second, and more devastating, such approaches leave out 
quintessential features of human agency, namely motives, purposes, the personal 
interpretations and viewpoints of people, character and contexts, to name but a few. 
Suppose I have made a promise to do something for a particularly shady character. As the 
time draws near for me to fulfill my promise, I find myself leaning against carrying it out 
because of the deep sense of shame I feel about the whole matter. In the end, though my 
character is such that I am normally reliable in carrying through on promises, I break it 
because of my overwhelming sense of shame. But the fact that I feel such shame is 
inexplicable on either physicalist or dualist objectifying accounts because shame is 
inextricably wrapped up with the way I conceive things in this society, the kinds of 
meanings shady characters in my society have (indeed, even what it means to be a shady 
character in the first place) as well as my sense of how I should respond to such people. 
Furthermore, my purposes for initially making the promise, whether noble or ignoble, are 
also bound up with such meanings and my goals and aspirations. These meanings, purposes 
and contexts, I suggest, need to take center place in our approach to understanding mind and 
agency. 
 
A third suggestion is also connected with the first two. In essence, physicalist and dualist 
views, and indeed the objectifying impulse lying behind them, tend to reduce or displace 
narrative forms of explanation with mechanistic forms. Ultimately, the goal is to explain 
mind and action in terms of efficient causal mechanisms through a “scientific” account or 
otherwise (this is objectification par excellence). The pursuit of such accounts are, in part, 
founded in the same kinds of questionable moral underpinnings as I discussed above and, as 
such, should invite suspicion as to how much we should lean upon them. But it is also the 
case that mechanistic explanations completely ignore the narrative character of human 
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living (e.g., Guignon 1989; Bruner 1990; Dunne 1996; Richardson, Fowers and Guignon 
1999; Bishop 2007; MacIntyre, 2007). We are what Joseph Dunne (1996) calls “storied” 
selves, a kind of temporal becoming that has the rough, changing unity of a narrative whose 
last chapter has yet to be written. Our being existentially and morally engaged in this 
process means that we come to appreciate the meaning of the stories we inhabit primarily by 
living them. We move forward by hammering out our convictions in risky and uncertain 
circumstances, including the unpredictable emotional adventures of human relationships–
not, in the main, through more distanced or detached rational analysis (or through the 
relatively more bloodless business of calculating what are more or less efficient or effective 
instrumental actions and adjusting our behavior accordingly). 
 
Furthermore, the narrative structure of our lives exhibits forms of final and formal 
causation. For example, human action always takes place against a background of explicit 
or implicit assumptions, values, commitments and practices deriving from our cultural-
historical situation–cultural traditions, family upbringing, past experiences and so forth–
which cannot always be articulated and often remain unclarified. Our actions are always 
channeled by this background (formal causation) as well as being shaped by our vision and 
understanding of our own future (final causation). However, this narrative structure is also 
dynamic: As we are engaged in the daily hammering out of life, the meanings this 
background and our vision of the future have for us are changed. There is a flow of 
interpretation from the past and the future (as envisioned by us) to the present and back 
again, so to speak, such that not only is the story of our lives unfinished, but it is also 
reinterpreted and adapted in the light of new realities. Our lives are lived more holistically, 
spanning across past, present and future, rather than atomistically in the now. 
 
A narrative picture of human action, then, is simply more reflective of the sort of insights or 
understandings, be they illuminating or distorting, occurring in ordinary life. The 
understanding or accounts we arrive at rely only partially if at all on efficient causation, and 
characterize the human activities involved only peripherally in terms of more or less 
successful instrumental behaviors. Hence, from an ontological point of view, it simply 
makes no sense to base these narratives solely on genetic and neurophysiological 
mechanisms or to see them as mere products of evolutionary development (cf. O’Hear 
1997; Bishop 2007). From this perspective, it is entirely implausible that coherent 
psychological and social narratives of the type we live everyday could arise from mere 
genetics, neurophysiology and evolutionary biology (Williams 1987; Bishop 2007, pp. 129-
147; Nagel 2012, pp. 70-126). 
 
Embracing narrative accounts certainly does not mean that efficient causation plays no role 
in mind and agency, or that more mechanistic accounts in no way illumine our questions on 
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these matters. Our practices of abstraction, idealization, experimentation, and so forth, give 
us insight into the causal workings of many processes. However, our best scientific theories 
and models are themselves creative, inventive interpretations of the world. Partly for that 
reason, mechanistic explanations both of the physical world and of mind find their meaning 
ultimately in a larger story that is historical, practical, and meaningful in character. There is 
much that various natural sciences can teach us about the condition of dyslexia, cancer, or 
the physics of athletic and artistic performances. And correlational studies surely have a 
place in the study of human agency and interactions, helping us detect enduring patterns or 
regularities that might otherwise go unrecognized, such as the relative prevalence of 
dyslexia in English speaking countries, or the positive relationships between women’s 
literacy, on the one hand, and their economic well-being and fertility rates on the other. But 
the role that such processes and patterns play in our lives, the meaning they have for us, and 
the nature and direction of our efforts to cope with or alter them, are determined by the 
place they come to occupy within unfolding individual and social understandings. 
 
Several of the authors in After Physicalism point to ordinary life as being a sounder basis for 
theorizing than the sciences when it comes to understanding mind and action. 
Unfortunately, these authors mainly carry out this theorizing in a detached, abstracted way 
that exemplifies objectification (e.g., Swinburne and Göcke). By pursuing a more richly 
narrative approach to the lifeworld of human beings, they and their physicalist interlocutors 
likely will come to a better understanding of mind and agency than is presently available in 
the literature. 
 
As a final suggestion, all approaches to the question of mind and its relationship to the 
physical world need an engaged philosophy (in contrast to the disengaged philosophy 
represented in After Physicalism). This means developing a hermeneutic ontology for 
human agency. According to hermeneutics, human understanding and action have a 
fundamentally dialogical, relational character. The quality of our experience and the shape 
of our practices flow from the interplay and mutual influence between present and past, 
interpreters and events, readers and texts, the self and others. We can distort these processes 
by dishonesty, defensiveness, or force, but done poorly or well, mutual influence and 
relationality remain basic in an ontological sense. 
 
The basic idea is that we live in a historical and cultural context spanning across time from 
the past to the present and into the future. This context plays an important role in 
constituting the self that we presently are. From the beginning of our lives, our identities are 
shaped by the family, community and cultural traditions in which we are growing up. Yet 
from our earliest moments we are always engaged in these traditions and, at some level, are 
reinterpreting these traditions and, to some degree, reconstituting ourselves. This is a very 
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important sense in which our lives take on a dialogical or narrative character where the story 
of our lives is incomplete because it has yet to be fully written. 
 
This implies that an engaged approach to understanding mind in the world must take into 
account the deeply relational character of persons, that persons are only possible in 
relationship with and dependence upon other persons as well as a physical world that 
provides an arena for action (Gunton 1993; Taylor 1989; MacIntyre 2001; Bishop 2007; 
Slife and Richardson 2008). The raw independence of the punctual self (e.g., persons as 
substances) would have to be set aside in favor of developing a view of what it means to be 
a person in a world of persons along with how that world might emerge over time. No 
human being is independent of other human beings. Furthermore, we are all historical 
beings shaped not only by our life histories but also by centuries of social and cultural 
development. 
 
These four suggestions, I believe, will make room for a much fuller and open exploration of 
mind, the kinds of moral and prudential reasons lying behind the exercise of human agency, 
and our capacities. In addition, they will help us to further clarify the kinds of hidden moral 
dimensions lying behind various conceptions of mind and agency and, I think, move us a 
long way down the path of getting around the dilemmas currently facing many of the 
debates in the philosophy of mind. 
 
Conclusion 
 
On the whole, the essays and arguments in After Physicalism assume that the mind-body 
problem is independent of the physical, biological and social history of human beings. If I 
am right in what I have argued about the objectification that runs throughout so much of this 
volume, such assumptions of independence are not only false, but impede our ability to 
understand the actual nature of mind in our world. Moreover, coming to an understanding of 
mind in our world is as much about developing a positive ethical conception of human 
being in the world as it is about achieving epistemic clarity about human action. This is 
hard, challenging work (much harder and more challenging than contemporary physicalists 
and dualists realize), and we need more philosophers who will rise to the task of an engaged 
philosophy of mind. 
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